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BUILDING CODE ENFORCEMENT FOLLOWING HURRICANE HUGO IN SOUTH CAROLINA 
In the immediate aftermath of major disasters, homeowners and businessmen want 
to return to their residences and company structures, perform necessary repairs, 
and then get on with their lives as quickly as possible. Getting on with it, 
however, may not be a simple process wh i ch takes a few hours or even a few days. When 
structures are damaged and where building codes are strongly enforced, community 
leaders may be far more interested in the long term welfare of their citizens, 
putting them through a thorough building inspection and permit issuance process, 
than in guaranteeing speedy reconstruction by shortcutting the process. For 
public officials concerned with long term safety, a disaster can also provide a 
window of opportunity to enact more stringent building code requirements to 
regulate reconstruction and thereby improve the overall quality of structures in 
the community. Thus, how quickly a community recovers from a major disaster is 
partially determined by how community leaders trade off long term mitigation 
benefits against short term recovery needs. 
The enforcement of building codes following a major disaster has not been well 
studied. The purpose of this research was to investigate how building codes were 
complied with in the city of Charleston and neighboring South Carolina cities and 
counties during the initial recovery period following Hurricane Hugo. It was 
hypothesized that the sheer volume of damaged and destroyed buildings (estimated at 
over 80% of the buildings in Berkeley, Charleston, Georgetown, and Horry counties 
alone) would overwhelm the resources and capabilities of local building officials. 
It was further hypothesized that building officials would face a community wide 
demand for rapid rebuilding and that they would incorporate coping mechanisms, such 
as the granting of variances to building codes, which could accelerate the 
rebuilding process but which would also allow the same officials to retain control 
over the process. 
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METHODOLOGY 
This research was conducted using a case study approach. Data were gathered 
from open-ended interviews with community leaders, local and state building code 
officials, and civil engineers. Written documents were sought which recorded 
reconstruction decisions. (Interviewees and their communities will not be clearly 
identified for confidentiality reasons.) 
This study was conducted over a fifteen month period in conjunction with a 
National Science Foundation funded study to investigate the political process in 
the city of Charleston and the state of South Carol ina to mitigate future hurricanes 
and earthquakes following Hurricane Hugo. During that time period, which included 
four trips to South Carolina in November, 1989, and January, May, and September, 
1990, interviews were conducted with over 75 politically influential persons, 
including 17 directly relevant persons. The extended length of time to collect 
data proved very valuable. In initial interviews, there was a reluctance on the 
part of some building officials to openly discuss details of the rebuilding process; 
in these cases, many i ntervi ews were needed to gain the confi dence of the 
i ntervi ewee before accounts of what occurred were provi ded. Later i ntervi ews also 
revealed that initial damage assessments were often erroneous; with time to 
evaluate the true nature of the damage and their community's responses, 
i ntervi ewees were able to correct mi staken op in ions given hast il y wh il e they were in 
the process of recovery. Because there was often no way to veri fy the statements of 
the interviewees and there was no attempt to systematically collect data, the 
results of the i ntervi ews shoul d be vi ewed as tent at i ve and shoul d not be cons i dered 
as defi nit i ve. 
HISTORY OF BUILDING CODES AND CONSTRUCTION METHODS IN SOUTH CAROLINA 
To place the events in South Carolina into perspective, a brief history of 
building codes in the state is provided. Currently, there is no mandatory 
2 
statewi de bu il ding code. Cit i es and count i es have the opt i on of adopt i ng bu il ding 
codes, although they must adopt the Standard Building Code if they choose to 
. exercise their option. 
The desire among local officials for the adoption and enforcement of standard 
building codes in their communities is relatively recent (SCAC, 1989). Until 1972, 
when the state 1 egi s 1 ature adopted a fQrma 1 pol icy grant i ng incorporated cit i es and 
counties the power to adopt the Standard Building Code, only a few cities and 
counties independently enacted building code ordinances to meet their needs. The 
cities of Charleston and Columbia were the first to adopt building regulations, in 
1907 and 1916, respectively. Charleston County was the first to adopt the Standard 
Building Code for unincorporated areas in 1968. Slowly, other more populous 
counties like Greenville, Lexington, and Richland followed suit. By mid-1989, 
approximately half the cities and towns and 17 of the 46 counties (containing 75 to 
80% of the total state population) had adopted mandatory codes (Lindbergh, 1989). 
Although it is certainly important for communities to have building codes, the 
integrity of the structures is dependent on the enforcement of building codes. 
When the damage from Hurricane Hugo was first examined, it was clear that buildings 
constructed to code regulations fared far better than those which had not (AIRAC, 
1989). Gary Wiggins, Director of the South Carolina Building Codes Council, 
claimed that more serious damage occurred in those areas without code enforcement 
(AIRAC, 1989: 4). 
Bes ides 1 acki ng a mandatory statewi de bu il ding code, South Carol ina 1 aws do not 
require that building inspectors be certified. Local jurisdictions determine the 
qualifications of their building inspectors. There is a great unevenness among 
local communities and counties in regard to the quality and qualifications of 
building officials. At the time of Hurricane Hugo, only one building inspector in 
the state was reported as having an engineering degree. Several respondents 
remarked that the majority of building official s were pol itical appointees who were 
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educated through on-the-job training, although there was a conscientious movement 
in many localities to increase the number of trained, certified personnel. When 
Hurricane Hugo struck, most communities and counties had three or fewer certified 
building inspectors. The city of Charleston was recognized as having the most 
professional staff in the state. 
Due to the fact that the adoption of building codes by a minority of counties in 
the state has been such a recent phenomenon, a significant number of buildings in the 
state were constructed without regard to building codes. Because the state had a 
hi story of recurri ng hurri canes and had been shaken by a major earthquake in 1886, 
many poorly constructed buildings had been destroyed through the years. 
Presumably learning from experience, many indigenous builders had employed methods 
and materials in the construction of their structures to withstand some degree of 
wind and shaking. However, there was no inventory of buildings which identified 
which were well built and which were poorly constructed. 
The respondents generally agreed that the state and its communities were 
inadequately staffed with building officials, and they recognized the need for 
improved building standards. To overcome the deficiencies, concerned building 
officials and civil engineers formed Citizens and Organizations for Minimum 
Building Standards (COMBS) in 1987 to promote a mandatory statewide building code 
and to require certified building inspectors (Lindbergh, 1989). They drafted 
legislation, which was introduced by Senator Glenn McConnell and Representative 
Ralph Davenport in the South Carolina General Assembly in March, 1989, six months 
prior to Hurricane Hugo. The legislation failed to reach the floor of either house 
in the 1990 legislative session. (See Mittler, 1990, for a history of this bill.) 
FINDINGS 
The pri mary concern of th is study was to invest i gate the degree to wh i ch 1 oca 1 
communities enforced or deviated from their building inspection and permit issuance 
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processes and then to document specific decisions which led to these outcomes. 
Because 16 of the 24 counties severely damaged by Hurricane Hugo did not have 
mandatory building codes, the findings are limited to the few counties that did. 
1. No community attempted to enforce the building code on all structures 
damaged by Hurricane Hugo. The working hypothesis of this study was that the local 
building officials would be overwhelmed by the number of structures requiring 
inspection and would initiate ways to short circuit the official rebuilding 
process. That hypothesis proved to be true, especially in the most damaged 
counties. In one city with a relatively large professional staff, the building 
inspections department was tasked by the Mayor to survey the city and identify 
buil di ngs that were structura 11 y unsafe so they coul d be shored up or demo 1 i shed. A 
decision was made for the building officials to concentrate their energies on the 
worst of the damage. Unable to deal with structures suffering minor damage, 
especially to roofs, the chief building inspector reported that home owners could 
repair their own residences without inspection and permits if they claimed the 
buildings had suffered no structural damage. As far as he was concerned, given the 
limitations of his resources, this was the only way the city could cope with the 
scope of the disaster. A county official supported this decision because the 
"immediate problem was fixing the structures, not permits." 
In one inland city devastated by the hurricane, the director of public safety 
stated that his city suspended the enforcement of all building codes. Not being on 
the coast, the city was unprepared for a major hurricane and did not have the 
resources to deal with the destruction caused by one. In this city, public safety 
dictated that citizens be allowed to immediately repair their structures to provide 
needed shelter. 
The small staffs of building officials at both the city and county levels were 
forced into tradeoffs concerning the repair of residences. Instead of inspecting 
residential structures with minor damage, some concentrated on licensing 
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contractors, who showed up from allover the country. 
offi cia 1 s fe 1t they cou 1 d po 1 ice the qual i ty of repa irs. 
By issuing licenses, the 
In the city of Charl eston, 
outside contractors were required to be fingerprinted and photographed; many 
refused and left the area. 
Not all counties rejected their obligation to inspect all damaged structures. 
In one moderately damaged county, the County Council strictly forbade any 
suspension of inspections. To carry out his duties, the county's building and 
zoning administrator had his two certified building inspectors drive through the 
county and identify significant siding and structural damage. After 
identification, owners were notified that they would be required to obtain permits. 
So as not to make this an onerous task, all permit fees were waived. While the 
initial inspections took place, the administrator began hiring additional 
temporary inspectors. (FEMA funds were available to partially cover the costs.) 
Because of the high number of ret ired people in the 1 oca 1 area, he was able to fi nd 
two retired building inspectors and several tradesmen (e.g., electricians, 
plumbers, and contractors) who could be trained rapidly on the job. 
The feeling among many county officials was that permit fees were a barrier to 
homeowner compliance. To encourage homeowners to seek permits, respondents from 
three counties reported that in two counties permit fees were waived and in one 
county permit fees were cut in half. All believed that fee reduction was a 
successful means of improvi ng buil di ng code enforcement and homeowner comp 1 i ance. 
2. No city or county advocated or implemented a policy to grant building code 
variances. Universally, granting variances was not perceived as a method to speed 
up the rebuilding process. In fact, the opposite was cited as a reason not to employ 
this procedure. In both cities and counties, hearings would be needed to approve 
variances, adding to the bureaucratic steps needed to issue a building permit. 
Prior to Hurricane Hugo, cities and counties historically had routinely denied most 
variance requests, and, for the few granted, demanded that structural elements be 
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strengthened elsewhere to maintain a building's integrity. Clearly, granting 
variances was not considered a viable emergency procedure. 
Even if building officials had elected to grant variances, many building 
officials and civil engineers said candidly that there was no reason in South 
Carol ina for contractors to bother with variance requests. By simply ignoring code 
requirements, they could get what they wanted without the effort. Because building 
codes had been adopted so recently in most communities and many building officials 
had not been sufficiently trained to recognize when a structure was not being 
designed to code, there was no reason for contractors to indicate they were not going 
to build to code. They could claim their plans did comply with the code and expect 
to get their plans approved, or, if there was some doubt, they could enlist an 
engineer or an architect to approve the plans. With an architect's or a 
professional engineer's seal affixed to the documents, building officials would 
routi nely approve thei r approva 1 s. Most respondents concl uded that enforcement of 
building codes was so spotty that requests for variances were unnecessary. 
3. The strictest code enforcement resulted from the insistence of the Federal 
Insurance Administration (FIA). As part of the National Flood Insurance Program, 
the FIA was responsible for guaranteeing that structures undergoing repair meet the 
flood reconstruction guidelines, especially the elevation of structures above the 
IOO-year flood level. Threatened with the possible loss of insurance for their 
communities if reconstruction did not comply with federal guidel ines, local 
building officials were careful to enforce federal guidelines. Without the 
diligence of the FIA monitoring local actions, it is possible that the coastal 
regions would have been rebuilt without proper consideration given to mitigation. 
4. Damage assessment, project design, and reconstruction in the hardest hit 
areas were aided immensely by volunteer engineers and architects. Almost 
immediately after the hurricane, the Volunteer Technical Assistance Group (VOLTAG) 
was established by the South Carolina Section of the American Society of Civil 
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Engineers and other professional architectural and engineering organizations. 
VOLTAG volunteers joined engineers from the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) to conduct damage assessments of public facilities in the 24 counties 
declared disaster areas by the President. Later, volunteers were able conduct a 
damage assessment of the Town of Sullivan's Island, where virtually every building 
was damaged and many were destroyed. Because the town had no full-time building 
inspector, the volunteer engineers provided the technical assistance first to 
identify and mark public and private hazardous facilities and later to conduct 
detailed inspections which formed the basis of a demolition and reconstruction 
program. 
Several months after the hurricane when the initial recovery period had passed, 
volunteers from VOLTAG assisted local communities in the design of new public 
buildings and in the supervision of project construction. These actions ensured 
that reconstruction met code requirements. (For a full description of the 
activities of VOLTAG, see Lindbergh, 1990). 
DISCUSSION 
How building codes were enforced in South Carol ina after Hurricane Hugo should 
not be taken as a mode 1 for other states. The bu il ding offi cia 1 s coped as best they 
could, but underlying negative attitudes toward building codes and their 
enforcement hindered the application of improved construction methods. In most 
cases, public officials and private citizens were not sufficiently motivated to 
demand that damaged buildings be reconstructed to withstand future natural 
disasters. As far as most were concerned, immediate recovery was more important 
than long-term mitigation. (Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to 
compare the rebuilding of Cal ifornia cities following the Lorna Prieta earthquake to 
the cities in South Carolina, the three cities hardest hit by the earthquake, Los 
Gatos, Santa Cruz, and Watsonvill e, and others enacted ord i nances withi n days of the 
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earthquake to strengthen building codes, especially in regard to the repair of 
unreinforced masonry buildings.} 
As one civil engineer reported, citizens in South Carolina will not demand more 
stringent building codes until their attitudes toward the consequences of natural 
disasters change. He holds the opinion that most citizens "do not believe that 
hurricane damage is an avoidable event." As far as the citizens are concerned, 
structural damage is "providential," not "preventable." This suggests that an 
effort to educate the public to the nature of disasters and how to prevent future 
destruction will be needed before construction practices throughout the state 
improve. 
Despite the seeming lack of desire for citizens to demand the improvement of 
their building stock, they have generally been protected by their structures. 
Recent detailed inspections of the communities impacted by Hurricane Hugo have 
indicated that the majority of damage was minor but repeated on a large scale. Most 
building inspectors and civil engineers are now convinced that the majority of 
damage was caused by inferior roofing and siding techniques and materials. 
According to these experts, even if building codes were mandatory and strictly 
enforced, damage from future natural disasters might still be substantial because 
the Standard Building Code does not adequately prescribe hurricane resistant 
roofi ng techni ques. They suggest that the code shoul d be strengthened where it is 
weak. 
Even though the state suffered cons i derab 1 e damage, the people of South 
Carol ina did not demand much of the state in terms of repair and mitigation. There 
appear to be two main reasons for this attitude. First, citizens traditionally 
have considered themselves to be self-reliant. Most live in rural settings and 
rely upon themselves and their neighbors. Second, until recently, most local 
governments have not been actively involved in either disaster recovery or 
mitigation. Most citizens consider themselves conservative, defining "good 
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government as no government. II In respect to their government bodies, most citizens 
expect little and do not complain when little is offered. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The response of build i ng and other government offi cia 1 sin South Carol ina was 
considered by every respondent to be IIreasonable, given this was a time of great 
stress. 1I The hypothesis that the amount of damage done to buildings in South 
Carolina due to Hurricane Hugo would overwhelm building officials so short cuts 
would have to devised for recovery to take place proved to be true. Building 
officials concentrated their energies on identifying the worst of the damage, 
particularly to publ ic buildings. In this endeavor, they were aided by volunteer 
engineers and architects. 
For the most part, inspect i on of res i dent i a 1 structures was 1 eft to homeowners. 
This proved to be one way that recovery was accelerated. In addition, the 
el imination or reduction of permit fees and the careful 1 icensing and monitoring of 
outside contractors were successful methods to ensure that building codes were 
adhered to. No community employed building code variances to speed up the permit 
process. 
Civil engineers believe there is no reason to believe that the built environment 
in South Carol ina is any safer now than it was before the hurri cane, except that many 
of the most vulnerable structures were destroyed and are being replaced by better 
buil di ngs. The deci s ions made by city and county offi ci a 1 s were a imed at short term 
recovery, not long term mitigation. As one civil engineer reported, for example, 
in some flood areas, houses and mobile homes are now mounted on blocks above the 
required FIA regulations, but they are so flimsy, they will probably be knocked over 
by wind and water forces. 
Until citizens and government officials decide that the prevention of future 
damage from natural disasters is humanly possible, it is doubtful that South 
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Carolina will learn much from Hurricane Hugo. It will also not be surprising to 
read an analysis similar to this following the next disaster. 
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